Disability rates in the Netherlands
Introduction
Disability rates in the Netherlands used to be among the highest in the world. In 2002 the number of disability recipients approached one million. At the time of writing, nine years later, the Netherlands are considered one of the prime examples of effective policy reform in the disability scheme for employees (Prinz and Tompson, 2009 ). The number of disability recipients is still high, but yearly inflow into the scheme has dropped to one third of the levels that were common until 2001.
Between 1998 and 2006 a series of successful reforms has taken place that triggered this decrease (see Van Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2010) . However, in recent years the number of beneficiaries in the special scheme dedicated to the young handicapped has increased rapidly. Therefore, reforms in the scheme for the young handicapped play an important role in the current policy debate.
In this paper, a long term forecast of the disability benefit stock is presented using a microsimulation model with multinomial logistic regression estimates for the transitions within the disability schemes based on the same administrative dataset. This microsimulation forecast is fully integrated in the annual budget process at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands. Microsimulation models are used by the Ministry for forecasting the disability benefit rolls since 2004. However, these models are not used as forecasting tools only, but as policy evaluation tools as well. In this paper, the long-term effects of recent policy measures on the disability stock are assessed by comparing the current simulation with a simulation using administrative data from a base year before the policy measures became effective.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 a brief overview of the Dutch disability system and a history of the most important past policy measures are given. Section 3 first gives a theoretical framework of the models and describes the data sources used. It then summarizes the microsimulation model that is used in this paper. In particular, the modelling and estimation of the inflow into and the outflow out of the disability schemes are presented. In section 4 the long term forecast is presented and the combined effect of the policy reforms is estimated. Section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations and topics for further research.
The Dutch disability insurance schemes
The Netherlands used to have three separate disability schemes covering employees (WAO), selfemployed (WAZ) and the young disabled (Wajong). The WAO was in force from 1967 onwards and the schemes for the self-employed and the young disabled (individuals who become disabled before the age of 18 and therefore have no chance to access the regular schemes for employees and selfemployed) both were introduced in 1976. The WAZ scheme was abolished in 2004 as government then decided to consider disability a risk that the self-employed could insure at the private market.
Therefore in this paper the WAZ will be left out of the analyses 1 . In 2006 the WAO was replaced with a new disability scheme for employees, called WIA.
The WAO integrated schemes for occupational diseases and work injuries (risque professionnel) and other disability causes (risque social), in one scheme, combining the generosity of risque professionnel schemes with a broad risk definition as common in risque social schemes. The number of benefits in the WAO grew rapidly and soon the scheme appeared to be unmanageable. In fact, as De Jong (2008) concludes, the WAO was misused twice to accommodate social change.
Firstly, during the 1970's and 1980's the scheme supported the change from an industrial society to a service oriented society. Massive lay-offs in the industries were partly transferred to the disability scheme, which provided a generous and permanent wage-related benefit. The WAO started to function as an early retirement route (see also Kapteyn and de Vos, 1997) . Secondly, according to De Jong, during the 1990's the WAO supported Dutch households in their transformation from a traditional single breadwinner type to a modern dual earner type. The OECD (2003) concluded that the Netherlands were among the OECD members with the highest disability benefit recipiency and inflow rates. In particular, the high inflow rates of women and the high overall benefit recipiency among the elderly were considered worrying given the oncoming ageing of the population. The decrease since then has been impressive. Current inflow levels in the employees' scheme are down by two-thirds compared to the turn of the century (35,000 vs. 100,000). The OECD (2008 and 2010) concludes that this success is a consequence of a series of very comprehensive reforms, characterised by a shift of responsibilities to employers and employees, a tightening in benefit eligibility and generosity, and a (partial) privatisation of hitherto public schemes. However, inflow into the special scheme for the young handicapped has increased from 7,000 around the turn of the century to 17,000 now. Therefore, an analysis of the development of disability benefit schemes should cover both the employees' schemes (WAO/WIA) and the scheme for the young handicapped (Wajong). Figure 1 shows the development of the total disability stock and inflow since 1968. The main recent policy reforms that caused the decrease in the employees' scheme are the following:
 Experience rating and private insurance (1998 onwards). Until 1998 all employers paid a fixed premium rate for the disability scheme, regardless of the number of disability cases they had.
Since 1998 employers pay a differentiated premium rate covering the earlier years of the disability benefit.  Re-examinations of the disability stock (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) consists of two phases. During the first phase, the benefit level equals the unemployment benefit. During the second phase, a generous wage subsidy is paid to the ones that work to a sufficient amount of their abilities, but only a small minimum benefit is paid to the ones that do not. Also the minimum grade of disability in this scheme is 35% instead of 15% in the WAO.
Theoretical framework and data
In this section the microsimulation model used for making long term forecasts of the disability schemes is presented. It starts with a short introduction in section 3.1 and a theoretical framework in section 3.2. Section 3.3 gives a brief overview of the data sources used. In section 3.4 the modelling of the inflow into, outflow from and transitions within the disability schemes is discussed. In section 3.5 the estimation results of the multinomial logistic regression models used for the transitions within the schemes are presented. They are input for the microsimulation model. The results from the microsimulation model itself are presented in section 4.
Introduction
The use of microsimulation models in policy assessment and evaluation is becoming more widespread ( Van Sonsbeek, 2011) . This paper uses the dynamic population microsimulation model that is currently in use for making the long-term budgetary forecasts of the disability schemes at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The model is originally described in Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2006) and is developed for forecasting the effects of the introduction of the WIA. In this model, a sample of the disability stock is taken and samples of the most recent inflow cohort are added for each forecasted year. The size of the inflow cohorts is corrected for demographic change.
Outflow probabilities are cell-based rates based on the most recent outflow cohort. The grade of disability and the working status do not vary over time.
The original model is adapted in three ways in order to improve the forecasts. First, for the inflow forecasts, not only the size but also the composition of the inflow cohorts is corrected for demographic change. Second, the outflow rates are now estimated with a multinomial logistic regression model. Third, the grade of disability and the working status are now variable over time.
Together with the major outflow routes (recovery and mortality) these transitions (from fully disabled to partially disabled and vice versa and from working to unemployed and vice versa) are now also estimated with a multinomial logistic regression model.
Theoretical framework
A calculation model for simultaneously generating forecasts of the labour force and the disability benefit population is given in Aarts and de Jong (1992) . In their model the flow models of the labour force and the DI population are linked through the inflow into and the recoveries from the DI population. In our microsimulation model, the labour force is exogenous. However, the transitions within the DI population are modelled in a very detailed way. We start from a simple description of stock and flows of the DI population of a certain scheme.
(3.1) +1 = + − where S t represents the stock of DI beneficiaries in year t, I t the inflow and O t the outflow.
We add to this the notion that the stock of disability beneficiaries of a scheme consists of several relevant subgroups. A first important subdivision within the disability schemes is between the fully and partially disabled. The partially disabled tend to have lower benefits, higher recovery rates and lower mortality rates. As the grade of disability can change over time, the transitions between fully and partially disabled and vice versa need to be modelled. However, the number of cases in each individual class of partial disability is rather small. Therefore, all classes of partially disability are aggregated. This is only a minor limitation as a higher class of partial disability does not necessarily correspond with a more severe limitation. The class of disability is determined by the loss of income as compared to the wage before disability. This implies that higher incomes tend to populate the Well-known disability inflow determinants are age, gender, ethnicity, cohabitation status and wage (Selten and Copinga, 2003) . Also employer-specific factors like sector and company size are important. However, the inflow data collected by the benefit administration office only include a limited set of personal characteristics that are relevant for determining and paying the benefit: from the inflow determinants only age, gender, wage and sector are known. Moreover, no reliable estimates on future development of wage and sector distribution are known, so future inflow trends can be controlled for by age and gender only. This is shown in equation (3.5). where for gender i and age j, I i,j,t represents the inflow in year t, L i,j,t-2 represents the labour force from two years earlier and r i,j,t-k represents the fraction of the inflow of k years earlier that re-entries the benefit scheme in year t after being out for a while.
The main reasons for termination of a benefit are recovery, mortality and pensioning (when someone turns 65, the legal retirement age in the Netherlands, the disability benefit is automatically terminated In sum, the above system is fully determined by the inflow I, the outflow components R and M and the transitions T i,j . In section 3.4, estimation of these functions will be described.
Data
Data are supplied by UWV, the benefit administration office. Since 1999, micro datasets of the disability schemes are supplied. The datasets contain both the flows (all benefits that started or terminated during the year) and the stock of benefits by the end of the year. Although the administrative data sources are complete and accurate, the data are mostly limited to the information that is needed for determining and paying the benefit. These include for example birth date, wage, grade of disability, start date of the benefit and termination date of the benefit. The 
Estimation strategy
In the microsimulation model, new inflow cohorts are taken from a sample of the most recent inflow cohort, with a correction for the changing weight of the corresponding age/gender class in the working population or the general population. Re-entry cases are already part of the sample. For the WIA-scheme, the number of re-entry cases is still low because the WIA exists only for 4 years.
Additional re-entry cases for future inflow cohorts are added based on the re-entry pattern of the last full WAO inflow cohort from 2004.
For recovery, mortality and transitions between subgroups, it holds that if a scheme consists of n subgroups, there are (n 2 +n) functions to be estimated: (n 2 -n) transitions from one subgroup to another, n recovery functions and n mortality functions. At the individual level, all transitions are binary choices, so a logistic regression suits this purpose. However, because all transitions, including recovery and mortality, from a certain subgroup (the reference state) can be considered competing risks, a multinomial logistic regression is chosen.
It is known from previous research that age, gender, duration of the benefit and disability grade are major outflow determinants (Linder, 2005 and Jehoel Gijsbers, 2007) . Therefore, in all models, age, gender and duration are used as dependent variables 4 (disability grade needs not be modelled because separate models are estimated for fully and partially disabled). The relevance of age, gender and duration of the benefit becomes clear from figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 gives recovery .
Benefit duration indeed is an important predictor of recovery as recovery is concentrated in the early years of disability. Recovery rates are also found to be consistently higher for women and for both men and women to peak in the second year after inflow and decrease from then on, with small peaks after 5 and 10 years because of the periodic re-examinations. Figure 3 gives mortality rates for men and women by age for the WAO scheme in 2004. As expected mortality rates are found to be consistently higher for men and for both men and women to rise by age. that indeed recovery rates peaked in the years the re-examinations took place. In particular for the Wajong scheme also a dummy for the age of 18 years is allowed to enter the model. This age dummy is not the same as the dummy for duration of 0. The majority of beneficiaries in the Wajong enter the scheme at 18 but a sizeable minority enters the scheme at a later age. It is to be expected that the kind of disablements of the later entrants (and therefore their transition rates) differ from the kind of disablements of the early entrants (mainly congenital diseases). Secondly, duration 2 and age 2 are used as quadratic relationships of transitions with duration or age may exist. Higher grade polynomials are not used as there is not really a logical explanation for those structures and the interpretation of the coefficients becomes very difficult. Finally, also the cross-term age*duration is used. This reflects the idea that benefit duration has a different impact at different ages. For example because the distance to the labour market and the human skills of the beneficiaries deteriorate more rapidly when they enter the disability scheme at a higher age.
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Men
Women
One transition in the WIA that cannot be modelled in the way described above is the transition from the WGA-scheme for partially disabled and temporarily fully disabled to the IVAscheme for permanently fully disabled. The fully disabled in the WGA-scheme are regularly reexamined. As soon as their disablement is considered to be permanent, they qualify for the IVAscheme. However, how many of the fully disabled in the WGA will eventually qualify for the IVA and when they will do so is not yet clear as the WIA exists only for 4 years now. In earlier calculations of the effects of the WIA (SER, 2004) a duration of 5 years is chosen as a cut-off point for permanent disability. However, there is no formal rule allowing the fully disabled after 5 years of disability to enter the IVA-scheme. In the simulation it is assumed that after 2, 3 or 4 years of being fully disabled, WGA-beneficiaries have a 10% chance of qualifying for the IVA. After 5 or more years of being fully disabled they have a 50% chance of qualifying for the IVA. On average, in this scenario WGAbeneficiaries qualify for the IVA after being fully disabled for 5.5 years.
The above transitions can be represented in a transition matrix. The reference states are fully disabled and partially disabled (whenever relevant further subdivided in working and unemployed).
The transition states equal the reference states plus two additional states for outflow through recovery and outflow through mortality. Not all transitions have to be modelled. In the WIA-scheme, up till now, almost all outflow from the IVA is because of mortality. Outflow through recovery is rare and transitions to the WGA-scheme are almost non-existent, just as was intended as the IVA covers the permanently, fully disabled. The transition matrices are summarized in tables 1-3 with mean transition rates based on the 2009 data: Group sizes vary from very large (WAO-scheme and fully disabled in the Wajong-scheme) to small (partially disabled in the WIA-scheme and partially disabled in the Wajong-scheme). The small number of partially disabled in the WIA-scheme is due to the WIA being in force only for four years.
In the Wajong-scheme, the grade of disability is determined in the same way as in the WIA-scheme.
However, the result of this process almost always amounts to full disability because of two reasons.
First, as Wajong-applicants usually are 18 years old when they apply for the benefit, they have no working history, so no wage to compare the loss of income with. Therefore, the legal minimum wage is taken as a benchmark. Second, only jobs on the regular labour market, that earn at least the legal minimum wage, are taken into account in the process. This implies that either, the applicant is able to earn the regular minimum wage, so his grade of disability will be 0%, or the applicant is not able to earn the regular minimum wage, so his grade of disability will be 100%.
Estimation results
The models chosen are presented in table 4. For the WAO-scheme the duration dummies for 0, 1 and 5 years enter the model in all years. In 2004, also the dummy for 10 years is included. In the Wajongscheme, the dummy for 0 years and the dummy for age 18 enter the model in 5 out of 6 cases (except for the partially disabled in 2009), Durationgenerally included in the WAO-and WIA-models. Age 2 is not included in most models. The full sets of parameter estimates are included in appendix A (WAO-scheme), B (WIA-scheme) and C (Wajong-scheme). A closer look at the parameter estimates reveals the following: consistent. In all years men have significantly higher mortality rates than women. Also in all years, fully disabled men have a higher probability of becoming partially disabled and partially disabled women have a higher probability of becoming fully disabled. As expected, mortality rates rise by age and recovery rates decrease by age, although this cannot be deducted straightforwardly from the coefficients as both age and age 2 are used in the model. Interesting are the differences in recovery rates between men and women. In 2000 fully disabled men and partially disabled women have significantly higher recovery rates. In 2004, women have higher recovery rates both among fully and partially disabled. In 2009, men again have higher recovery rates both among fully and partially disabled, the latter albeit not significant. for the fully disabled in the WGA-scheme, there are no significant gender differences in mortality rates left. This may be attributed to the entrance criteria for the WIA being much tighter than for the WAO. In the WAO, inflow rates of women were much higher than for men, apparently implying that women in the WAO were less severely disabled than men. Transitions from fully disabled to partially disabled still are more common among men. However, there is no gender difference in transitions from partially disabled working to unemployed and vice versa. In general, recovery rates are lower in the WIA than in the WAO when controlled for age and duration. This may reflect the fact that inflow rates into the WIA are so low that the WIA beneficiaries are more severely disabled than the WAO beneficiaries, resulting in lower recovery rates and higher mortality rates overall.
 Wajong: There are substantial differences between the coefficients of the Wajong and WAO/WIA-schemes. As the Wajong-scheme covers mainly congenital diseases, the majority of beneficiaries enter the scheme at the age of 18. For all transitions the dummy for age 18 is significant: the ones that enter the Wajong at 18 have significantly higher recovery rates but no different mortality rates. There is a strong correlation between recovery rate and age and/or duration of the benefit. After a while in the benefit, recovery rates diminish, which may also explain why beneficiaries that enter the scheme at age 18 still have higher recovery rates as they are still developing (e.g. in case of lighter forms of mental disablement). In the Wajong-scheme the share of partially disabled is very low, typically around 2% of the stock of beneficiaries. This complicates model estimation with typically only a very small number of significant explanatory variables remaining in the models for the partially disabled.
Simulation and results
In this section, the microsimulation model described in section 3 is used for making long-term forecasts of the DI-schemes. 
Current long-term forecast of the disability schemes
The disability benefit microsimulation models are currently being used for making budget forecasts world. An important added value of the models is in the accurate and detailed forecasts of mean benefit levels. In all disability schemes, benefit levels follow trends that are very difficult to predict with time-series analysis. One example is the WAO benefit regime that consists of a higher benefit during the early years of the benefit and a lower benefit during the later years for all beneficiaries that entered after 1993 and a permanently high benefit for the beneficiaries that entered in 1993 or before. Another example is the WGA benefit that, for the unemployed partially disabled, consists of a high benefit during the period of unemployment benefit and a much lower benefit thereafter. The cohort effects of such different regimes very much complicate forecasting a generic time trend.
The most recent forecast, which is also used in this paper, is described in detail in Alblas, Ouwehand and Van Sonsbeek (2010) and is based on the 2009 micro dataset. The core result of this publication is that the total number of disability benefits stabilizes from 2009 onwards. The number of benefits in the employees' schemes (WAO and WIA) decreases by 235,000 (39%) but this effect is compensated by the increase of the number of benefits in the Wajong scheme for the young handicapped by 220,000. This result has been an important input for determining the focus of the new government's plans on disability insurance, namely to reduce the number of benefits of the young handicapped. 
Evaluation of inflow-related policy measures
The combined effect of the inflow-related policy reforms can be deducted by comparing the microsimulation forecasts from subsequent years. This section specifically focuses on the forecasts Currently, WIA inflow is rising, which raises doubts about how stable the inflow levels of recent years will be. However, recent research ( Van Deursen and Van Loo, 2010) indicates that the rising inflow is mainly due to structural factors like size and composition if the working population, which are accounted for in the microsimulation model.
But also when the WIA inflow stabilizes at current levels, there are two limitations to the WIA effects. First, it should be noted that part of the WIA-effect is artificial because costs of the second 
Evaluation of outflow-related measures
On the outflow-related policy measures, in Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2010) Apparently the effect of decreasing overall recovery rates overcompensates the temporary increase in recovery rates of the younger part of the stock during the re-examination operation.
A possible explanation is that the abolishment of the periodic re-examinations has been harmful because a substantial number of recoveries are not detected anymore. This may be caused by a lack of re-examination capacity (because the benefit administration office was so occupied by the re-examinations operation that the re-examinations of the rest of the population are not performed with the intended strictness) or the benefit administration office not being able to select the re-examination cases adequately. Also, the effect of the re-examinations themselves may be more modest in net terms than it seemed because part of the beneficiaries that lost the benefit after being re-examined would have recovered anyway. It can be argued that, now the re-examinations have ended, recovery rates might rise again because additional re-examination capacity becomes available. In that case, because the re-examinations operation finished almost a year ago, such an effect should have shown in the outflow numbers since. However, during 2009 it has not and in the first half of 2010 outflow rates indeed have been rising slightly, but not enough to make a substantial difference.
Although much care has to be taken when interpreting these results, it can be concluded that, especially when compared to the very effective inflow-related policy reforms, the net effects of the outflow related policy measures are minor at most.
An integral long-term forecast of all disability schemes
In order to get the picture complete, the Wajong-scheme needs to be included in the analysis. Jong (2008) , who argued that the WAO-scheme was misused in the past in order to accommodate social change, the Wajong scheme can be argued to accommodate the transition to an information and technologically oriented society, leaving large groups of poorly educated young not productive enough for the regular labour market on benefit. Therefore, government has initiated a new system reform for the Wajong-scheme. Whether this reform is as successful as previous reforms remains to be seen, especially as it lacks financial incentives for employers and entrance criteria of the scheme remain unchanged.
When the growth of the Wajong stock is taken into account, the total number of disability benefits now stabilizes at almost 800,000 (11% of the working population), still substantially lower logic as the WAO/WIA beneficiaries are employees with a working history whereas the Wajong scheme is intended for the young disabled that have no working history. The conclusion of table 5 is twofold. The combined long-term effect of the policy measures on the number of WAO/WIA-benefits is huge: 832,000 (69%) less benefits and 661,000 ( random shocks influence the inflow or outflow patterns in a certain year, the impact on the long term forecast will be large. Nonetheless, the forecasts provide the best possible estimate and therefore the base for policy discussions.
Conclusions and topics for future research
Disability benefit policy has been at the center of political debate in the Netherlands during the last couple of decades. Until 2001 disability rates in the Netherlands used to be among the highest in the world. Since then, some very effective policy measures have been introduced. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands uses dynamic microsimulation models both for forecasting the disability benefit schemes and for evaluating the effects of policy measures.
When the 2000 inflow rates would have been continued into the future, the number of disability benefits would have risen to 1.2 million or 17% of the working population by 2040 in the WAO scheme or 1.4 million or 20% of the working population in the WAO and Wajong scheme together. As a consequence of experience rating, gatekeeper protocol and tightened eligibility criteria inflow into the WAO scheme had already halved before the WIA came into force, resulting in the number of DI benefits stabilizing at 600,000 or 8.5% of the working population in 2040. The WIA causes the number of benefits to further decrease to 370,000 but the effect of the WIA is smaller in cost terms.
All those effective policy measures have one thing in common: they focus on preventing inflow. Indeed, prevention is the best way in the long run of keeping DI numbers low. Only the reexaminations of the disability stock from 2004 to 2009 caused a significant increase in disability outflow. However, this increase came at a cost. At the same time the re-examinations boosted outflow, the recovery rates of the population not affected by the re-examinations decreased sharply, possibly because of the change in the re-examination periodicity. In the long run, this may cause a higher disability stock in the WAO, causing net losses instead of net gains.
Whereas the key to success appears to have been found for the disability schemes for employees, new problems have risen in the scheme for the young disabled whose numbers have been rising rapidly during the past couple of years. When the current inflow numbers are continued into the future, the number of Wajong benefits would grow to almost 450,000, which is even more than the number of WIA benefits. Indeed, it seems that the 'gains' in terms of reduction in benefits from the introduction of the WIA are compensated by the rising number of Wajong benefits. Again a disability scheme seems to be misused to accommodate social change, in this case the transformation to an information oriented society requiring higher education levels of its people and leaving large groups of people at the bottom of the labour market behind.
Important topics for future research include the effects of the recent Wajong reform that has been in force from January 1, 2010. Also, the possible relation between the decreasing number of WIA benefits and the rising number of Wajong benefits needs to be investigated further. Finally, it remains to be seen whether all policy reforms remain effective in the long run, especially when pressure on the disability schemes might increase in the future when the retirement age is raised and early retirement pathways will be blocked. -0,001 (0,001) 0,000 (0,000) 0,001 (0,000) *** *** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05 Table C 
